Borders, when enforced, do influence migration patterns—just not always in the simple “stop people entirely” way critics expect. Empirical evidence shows that stronger border enforcement tends to reduce unauthorized crossings at specific points and can shift routes or methods. For example, increased surveillance and barriers have historically pushed crossings toward more remote and dangerous areas, which indicates they do have a deterrent and displacement effect. If borders were truly ineffective, you wouldn’t see those behavioral changes.

our argument relies too heavily on symbolic examples and overlooks measurable effects. First, invoking the Great Wall or the Berlin Wall is not analytically sound. Those structures operated in entirely different political, technological, and geographic contexts. Modern border barriers are not meant to be impenetrable fortresses; their purpose is to raise the cost and difficulty of crossing, thereby reducing volume and channeling movement into more controllable points. By your standard—“it doesn’t stop everyone”—almost no policy tool would qualify as effective. Second, you acknowledge adaptation by smugglers, but that actually concedes the core point: if actors are forced to change tactics—digging tunnels, using ladders, or rerouting—that indicates the barrier is exerting pressure. The relevant question is whether crossings become less frequent, more detectable, or more resource-intensive. Evidence from multiple border regions shows that fencing, when combined with surveillance, does reduce crossings in specific sectors. Third, your alternative proposals are not substitutes in the way you suggest. More asylum judges address processing speed, not unauthorized entry. Tackling root causes is a long-term strategy with uncertain timelines and limited control by any single country. Technology helps, but it often works best when paired with physical infrastructure that slows movement and improves response time. You frame the wall as an “illusion of control,” yet dismiss a layered approach that includes it. Why assume that physical barriers must either fully solve the problem or be worthless? A more rigorous position would assess how much marginal benefit they provide relative to cost—not reject them outright based on the fact that they are not perfect.

You argue that walls don’t stop migration, they only change routes—and I agree with that point. But that is exactly why enforcement still matters. If a policy changes behavior, redirects movement, and reduces uncontrolled entry, then by your own logic, it is working. The fact that crossings move from San Diego or El Paso to more difficult terrain is not proof of failure—it is proof of deterrence in action. Yes, some people may still attempt to cross multiple times, but the key question is not whether migration stops completely—it’s whether it becomes more controlled, more predictable, and more enforceable. Even partial reduction in illegal crossings matters for national security and resource management. You also mention smugglers getting richer and danger increasing. That does not prove enforcement is useless—it shows why stronger enforcement and faster interception are needed, not weaker borders. Without barriers or controls, smugglers operate freely. With them, their operations are at least disrupted and riskier. Finally, your argument about “root causes” like violence and economics is important—but it is not a replacement for border enforcement. Long-term solutions take years or decades. A country cannot pause security while waiting for global conditions to improve. So using your own logic: If behavior is being redirected → enforcement is effective If smugglers face higher risk → enforcement is working If crossings become harder → deterrence is working The real issue is not whether barriers stop all movement—it’s whether they improve control and reduce uncontrolled flow. And on that measure, they do.