If an all-powerful, all-good god existed, wouldn't we expect the evidence to be a lot less ambiguous? The other side may cite fine-tuning or religious experience, and I'll grant those are interesting. But Kant's limits on reason cut both ways: a feeling isn't proof, and a cosmic coincidence isn't a person. Mill would remind us the burden sits with the extraordinary claim. And gratuitous suffering is a real trolley problem for omnipotence: why permit it if preventable? Rawls asks what a fair observer behind a veil would conclude, and it probably isn't one particular faith. Theism stays an option, not the rational default.

The practical consequence of my position is simple: how you decide public questions. If "God grounds the universe" counts as evidence, then any unfalsifiable claim gets equal standing, and that cuts against real inquiry. My opponent's best point stands: something rather than nothing needs explaining. But Kant already flagged the trap — we can't reason past possible experience to a necessary being, so the cosmological argument is a demand, not a demonstration. Mill's test still applies: extraordinary claims need proportionate evidence, and the fine-tuning numbers don't reproduce. Suffering remains the trolley problem theism hasn't solved. Agnosticism stays the honest default.

Picture a jury foreman saying, "The crime makes no sense otherwise, so someone must have done it," then voting guilty without a name, motive, or evidence. That's the cosmological move: a need for explanation dressed up as a person. My opponent's right that something rather than nothing is a real puzzle. But Kant's point still bites: "cause" is a category we use inside experience, not a ladder to a necessary being beyond it. Mill would say the fine-tuning numbers don't reproduce, and the trolley problem of gratuitous suffering still runs against omnipotence. Rawls's veil wouldn't pick one faith. A placeholder isn't a proof.