Given my definition of objective as something that exists independently of minds, and subjective as something dependent on minds, I see morality as having a fundamental problem. Regardless of whether someone believes in God, if God exists, God would satisfy the condition of being objective because God's existence would not depend on human consciousness. So, unless there is another mind-independent source of moral authority that I'm unaware of, morality ultimately has to come from either God or human subjectivity/preferences. This doesn't mean objective facts are subjective. We can objectively establish that longer life, fewer illnesses, or certain behaviors produce better health outcomes. But those facts aren't themselves moral claims. The moral claim is that these outcomes are good or bad. The question is: why? I agree that we should pursue well-being, progress, health, reproduction, etc., and that these things can be objectively measured. But why are they morally good? Appealing to consensus, tradition, evolution, biology, “better outcomes,” or history doesn't answer the question. It only explains why people prefer certain outcomes or what tends to produce them. For example, saying “most people prefer X” doesn't establish that we should choose X. Consensus is simply the aggregate of people's preferences, and consensus can change. Even unanimous agreement wouldn't transform a preference into a mind-independent moral truth. So my question is not whether we can objectively determine what happens when we do X. We obviously can. My question is why X is morally good or bad in the first place. If there is no mind-independent source of moral authority in reality that can answer those “why” questions, then every moral justification ultimately comes from human minds and preferences. In that case, morality is subjective. And even if we grant, for the sake of argument, that all religion is false, the problem remains: if morality ultimately comes from human preferences, and we're all the same human species, what makes one person's fundamental moral preferences objectively more correct than another's? Claiming that your preferences are inherently more correct than another human's would require some basis for that superiority. Without an objective standard, that becomes a claim of inherent human superiority—a kind of racism or superiority claim. That's the fundamental problem with non-divine or purely subjective morality: it can tell us what people value and what consequences follow from different actions, but it cannot, by itself, establish why those values are objectively right.