My argument is that God most likely exists. I am not trying to prove his existence for absolute mathematical certainty. That's what I mean by proof here. This is what I meant by not talking about absolute proof. Because I challenged the you, I will begin the argument: God is defined as a necessary, concrete, transcendent reality that is the ultimate explanation/ground of contingent reality. 1. Contingent things possible have an explanation 2. There are contingent facts 3. Let C be the conjuntion of all contingent facts. 4. C itself is contingent, as there is a possible world in which some contingent fact is different, so C could have been false. 5. Therefore, by premise 1, it is possible that C has an explanation 6. Any explanation of C must be non contingnet. If it were, then the explanation would be in C. 7. Therefore, if C has an explanation, the explanation of C must be necessary 8. Thus, it is possible that C has a necessary explanation 9. Given an axiom of S5 modal logic, the possibility of a necessary explanation entails that such an explanation actually exists 10. This explanation is a being because this explanation is the obtaining of the concrete contingent reality. A necessary explanation that is abstract such as 2+2 cannot be the explantion because it doesnt have any causual power. The explanation must be capable of standing in a explanatory relation to C. If you agree with this argument, then maybe we could go to why this is God tri omni sense.

please respond to my argument. I don't know if my thing is glitching because somehow you made an argument before my opening. But maybe I'm just new to this app

On premise 1, I clearly stated that every contingent fact POSSIBLY has an explanation then used modal logic to get a necessary explanation of C. Denying the weak version of the PSR should not be done either, as if it's not even possible for C to have an explanation, then brute unexplained contingency is metaphysically necessary. Then, the universe is necessary. That is the actual strange claim here. Every scientific inference you trust (or so Id assume) pressuposes that contingent states of affairs are at least the kind of thing that can be explained. Deny this just undercuts your own expectation that nature is intelligable. The burden is on you to explain why the principle does not work on C specificically even though it does on everything else as you rely on it everywhere else. Premise 4 has nothing smuggled in and I actually gave the reason why in my opening. C is the conjucntion of all contingent facts. Take a contingent fact F that is part of C. By definition of contingent, there is a possible world W were F is false. In W, the conjunction of contingent facts differ from C because F is false. Thus, C isnt true across all possibel worlds meaning its contingent. Premise 9: Your response would only somewhat work for Plantinga's modal ontological argument. But mine and his are different because my possibility is derived unlike his which is stipulated. This means my possibility is on much more modest and independently motivated claims. This means that by premise 8, I'm not making any assumption here as it's the conclusion of 1-7. On the part where you say even if right, not God: I actually said that in my opening. Get me to a necessary, concrete causally efficacious being and I still need to give omnis. But my premise 10 actually does a lot. If a necessary being's causal power was deterministic (so If N necessarily and mechanistically produced C,) then C would be necessary as well. since a necessary cause operating through necessary laws yields a necessary effect. This contradicts C being contingent. The only other possible for something necessary to create a contingent effect, is libertarian free will. A agent who could have created another state but chose this one. And a free, necessary, transcendent cause capable of choosing the obtaining of an entire contingent order is already doing the everything theism needs. The moves to omnisceince and omnibenevolence will need independent argumentation. But as the definiton I gave God above was: God is defined as a necessary, concrete, transcendent reality that is the ultimate explanation/ground of contingent reality. My argument gets this perfectly.

There is no transition problem as you claim because P4 established C is contingent and P5 applies P1 onto C. On P6, explanation is an irreflexive and asymmetric relation. This means that nothing can explain itself and nothing can be explanatorily prior to a whole of which it is a part.This is the same principle used in everywhere else in metaphysics and epistemology. (like ruling out the universe caused itself). If E is a conjunct of C, then E is part of what needs to be explained. Saying that E is doing the explaining is viscously circular. You could still explain E's existence, but then E's explanation is doing the work here. E iinst by itself. This is exaclty what P6 says. The indeterministic or non deterministic process without libertarian free agent argument doesnt work because this kind of explanation doesnt satisfy P1. You want some sort of brute indeterministic disposition but that just moves the brute contingency one step down. If N has an indeterministic disposition that could equally have produced C or some other C, then "why C and not C′" has no answer. The disposition would just be it could have gone either way and it just happened to go this way. That doenst actually explain C in terms of P1. My reasons based agent cause is completely different because when an agent chooses C over another option, thier reason for the choice is a distinct purpose not some antecedent cause that requries its own explanation. Purposefull and rational explanation are obviously different law governed physical causation and random chance. It's the only one that satisfies P1 as it gives a reason for why this specific outcome occured. Furthermore, I didnt just assert the possibility premise. I've state before that it's derived from 1-7. If you think it's unearned, then you must attack 1-7 and not just keep reasserting my possibility premise is ungrounded. I agreed that defining God as "the necessary concrete transcendent ground of contingent reality” doesn't prove that such a being exists." However, I'll give some arguments here. I've already given why this cause is a personal agent in my defense of Premise 10 that deterministic and brute chance causation dont work so the only possible one is reasons responsive agency. An agent that freely selects one contingent order over all others just is a person in the relevant sense. It's obviously necessary as I've established, and it is the ground of all contingent reality and isnt bounded by prior conditions or other causes as literally everything follows from this cause. Unbowneded creative power over all contingent things is omnipotence. Any knowledge it has must be built into the act of grounding and causing C it knows C by knowing its own creative act. This entails knowing all of so omniscience. I will concede that only omnibenevolence is not established by this argument and no serious philosopher even atheist has a problem with this part because Omnibenevolence is usally comes from independent reasoing. However with all of this, it is still most likely God exists and this is what our debate is focused on anyways.

The modal scope fallacy isnt so fallacious. P4 already makes C contingent while P5 then instanciates P1to that single fact. This isnt done by combining across conjuncts in different worlds. There’s no distributed over conjunction error. Furthermore, the modal feature that grounds P1 could have failed to obtain, therefore admits an explanatory question. You need some sort of independent reason that totality level facts are exempt. Just an observation that P1 is intuition on smaller cases. Now, the burden is on you. You claim that ive presented a false trillema, but I don’t see how this is the only possible solutions and none of them work. You have to give me another solution. You asked how a necessary being can make contingent choices: There are two possible responses: 1st, we can reject event causation in favor of agent causation. Your argument assumes that identical causes must yield identical effects which wrongly assumes that a cause must be a prior state that logically entails its effect. The alternative here I present is agent causation where the ultimate explanation ends with the agent as substance not with a collection of prior states, natures, or reasons. Therefore, necessary premises do not force the final choice to be necessary as well. The second, is that explanation does not have to a forcing mechanism. The PSR of my argument only is that a choice has a reason making it rational and non-arbitrary. It does not require that the reason forced the outcome. For example, God chose explanation C as it created a uniquely great balance of good. This is not a necessary creation because he could have chosen different options. Your problem with my PSR is a straw man, then begs the question, and then misunderstands the relationship between science and metaphysics. I did not argue that the denying it leads to saying the universe is necessary. Instead, I clearly argued that its denial leads to brute contignetism, that some contingent facts obtain without any sufficient reason why they obtain rather than not. Your arguing that contingent fact can be so and still lack a sufficient explanation. So you didnt argue anything and instead just argued its negation. You have given no argument that your theory is true. Furthermore, your claim that C has no explanation does not entail C is necessary. But this is completely irrelevant. It would only be true if weak PSR is false, so i have no clue why you brought this up. I dont kno why ur using a natural premise to go against weak PSR so ur question begging. Your just saying if we don’t assume the PSR, then PSR no follow. That doenst do anything. You then say a contingent fact could be contingent and still be having no explanation. This just leads to brute contingent facts. ANd you have given no reason for this. A brute contingent fact could have been otherwise, actually obtains, and then there is no sufficient reason for why it obtains. That is not a natural description of reality and it’s just a metaphysical posit that is completely absurd. It says at the foundation of reality, there is an arbitrary surd something that simply is, with no reason for its being so rather than otherwise. If you want to refute Weak PSR, you need to show either: some contingent fact actually lacks a sufficient reason, or that the existence of brute contingent facts is metaphysically possible, and that this possibility is compatible with the demands of intelligibility and rational inquiry. you have done neither. You then argue science doesnt save PSR. That was not a good reply at all. First, Weak PSR is not a scientific hypothesis. It is a metaphysical thesis. Science neither implies nor falsifies it. The fact that science works on the basis of provisional and localized explanatory hypotheses is perfectly compatible with Weak PSR. Scientists do not have to posit the metaphysical thesis that “all contingent truths have explanations” in order to study phenomena. But that does not mean that Weak PSR is false. It merely means that science is not metaphysics. Second, the way scientists search for explanations presupposes something along the lines of Weak PSR. When scientists come across some phenomenon they cannot explain, they don’t say, “Maybe it’s just a brute fact.” Instead, they see this phenomenon as an anomaly which has to be explained. Why? Because the presupposition of rational inquiry is that there is an explanation out there. If brute facts are possible, why not just assume that any recalcitrant anomaly is one? Third, science cannot discover a brute fact. How can it? It may find out that the existing explanations are inadequate. It may discover that something is causeless or indeterminate. But it cannot discover that there is absolutely no explanation for something. Lack of explanation is not an empirical fact. It is a metaphysical position. Thus, scientific reasoning cannot prove brute contingency. So either your appeal to science, in fact supports Weak PSR, which is the transcendental requirement for scientific enterprise to be possible. According to your position, it might turn out that reality includes truths which are completely arbitrary. Then there will be no guarantee that rational investigation can proceed intelligibly. Reality might just include irrationalities. The fact that reality was found to be intelligible all this time is merely a lucky coincidence. Weak PSR accounts for the reason why investigation is rational: reality is intelligible. According to your position, intelligibility is an accidental property. This is not a refutation of Weak PSR. This is what follows from abandoning Weak PSR. This is something you do not acknowledge. On the OMNIs, first I agree that the definition alone doesn't prove God's existence. I never claimed that it did. The argument proves the existence of something that satisfies that definition: a necessary, concrete, transcendent ground of contingent reality. That is precisely what I defined ‘God’ as. So saying your arguments about me not getting to the OMNI attributes just attacks something I never argued. I've already conceded that OMINs need further arguments. They aren't needed to establish the proposition as I've defined it. You are attacking the definition rather than the argument that establishes the thing defined. Here’s the issue: The core theistic claim is that God is the final and necessary ground of all contingent being. Omnipotence, omniscience, and other attributes like these follow from the definition of that which grounds all contingent reality rather than the modal subproof alone. Your objection amounts to a strawman. You have misinterpreted P1. The proposition is not “every contingent fact does actually have an explanation,” as per the PSR. It is that contingent facts are potentially explainable. But to deny this is to claim that there is a contingent fact that is in principle unexplainable in all worlds. But C is contingent. Now, if C is potentially explainable, then its explanation cannot itself be contingent, or else it would be part of C. Thus, C is contingent. ◇E(C) E(C) → N Therefore ◇N S5: ◇□N → □N Therefore, N exists necessarily. It is not S5 that bears most of the weight here. What step 6 establishes is that if C is explainable, then any explanation must be non-contingent. S5 only converts the possibility into necessity. In fact, your “unexplained contingent fact” objection isn’t even an explanation but the refusal to explain. It explains neither why C is rather than not, why C has that character, nor why the explanation should stop exactly there. Theism provides a necessarily existing ground; Brute-C provides an ungrounded assertion. Theism wins in terms of inference to the best explanation since it provides maximal scope for explanation and there is no arbitrary termination point. You have no explanation at all. Your call for probability is misplaced. In metaphysics, “most likely” means best explanation, not probability. If you need a probability calculus for God’s existence, you need it also for brute-C, and you have no such probability calculation available. Not only does the argument state, “if my premises are right, then God exists,” it states that in light of the possibility of an explanation of the whole of contingent reality, there can be no other terminus for explanation than theism. Brute-C is not just an alternative, but explanatory failure. Any such explanation must necessarily be concrete. There can be no getting away with any abstract object like "2+2," since abstracta have no capacity to be causally/explanatorily efficacious with respect to contingent reality. The explanation must be such that it could stand in an actual explanatory relationship to C. Such an explanation entails a concrete necessary being – God. All you have done is presupposed that a conditional metaphysical proof must be treated like a probability theorem in order to complain that it is conditional. Yet, all metaphysical arguments are conditional upon first principles. The question at hand, then, is whether or not it is more rational to accept that contingent reality may be possibly explained or that the entire contingent order might just be a brute fact. The latter leads nowhere. It all boils down to this: while your hypothesis makes it possible for C to be unexplained, Theism accounts for C. Hence, on the only rational measuring stick there is, God most likely exists.