V: MORALITY
VC: MINIMIZING SUFFERING
I affirm the resolution: De-Extinction is unethical. I value Morality, as the word “unethical” in the resolution implies a moral obligation. My value criterion is Minimizing Suffering.
Prefer this criterion, as suffering is universally experienced, urgent, and provides a clearer baseline for action than abstract ideals. It is a concrete standard for what this debate should be measured by. Thus, minimizing suffering is the only criterion the Judge should vote upon.
DEFINITIONS:
“De-extinction is the process of creating an organism which is – or greatly resembles – a member of an extinct species.”
- https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC4157387/
“Unethical -not conforming to a high moral standard : morally wrong”
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/unethical
Contention 1: ANIMAL WELFARE
De-extinction is cruel to existing endangered creatures and unborn creatures – mammoths and elephants prove.
Doyle et al. 25 [David M Doyle, Associate Professor of Law, Maynooth University, Natallia Hlushchenko, Postdoctoral Research Fellow, Maynooth University Social Sciences Institute, and Senior Lecturer in Law, Academic and Research Institute of Law, Sumy State University, Shane Mccorristine, Reader in Cultural History, Newcastle University, and Kevin Healy, Lecturer in Zoology, School of Natural Sciences, Ollscoil na Gaillimhe—University of Galway, 12-19-2025, "Should we patent the ‘Woolly Mammoth’? Ecological and animal welfare objections", OUP Academic, https://academic.oup.com/jiplp/article/21/2/114/8384325]/Kankee
B. Animal welfare concerns First, analogous to the formative decisions on the patentability of transgenic animals, if a patent were applied for on a de-extinct woolly mammoth ‘it could raise concerns on the appropriateness of granting patents on sentient animals’.69 As appellant 5 argued in Harvard/Transgenic Animals, one cannot legitimately balance animal suffering against medical use because animals are sentient beings and patenting them commodifies and increases their production and suffering.70 Admittedly, ‘it is a difficult task for the Patent Office to fairly apply the sensitive aspect of morality to the examination of a certain technology’,71 but it can be argued that de-extinct woolly mammoths, confined to zoos or amusement parks, would be subject to ‘unacceptable levels of suffering’ in captivity.72 Indeed, Browning has observed that animal welfare concerns are ‘likely to be most pronounced’ with species such as the woolly mammoth ‘due to their behavioural complexity’.73 Before their extinction, woolly mammoths were reputedly ‘highly social animals’,74 and so rearing a tiny number of them in an artificial habitat, whether in a zoo or in a managed ecosystem, may be deemed a cruel practice.75 Furthermore, the environment in which a recreated woolly mammoth would now live—if released into the wild—would be widely different from the one that was present when the original woolly mammoths roamed the earth.76 Equally, it seems reasonable to surmise that de-extinct woolly mammoths ‘would alter any habitat into which they were released, and possibly in ways that we have not yet imagined’.77 Recreating the ‘social contexts in which mammoths can be placed’ will thus be ‘key to their survival and an additional challenge to overcome’.78 Secondly, Rule 28 1(d) of EPC explicitly includes the words ‘likely to cause . . . suffering’, and thus there are strong arguments that those advocating for mammoth de-extinction must show how the welfare of de-extinct woolly mammoths will be protected.79 True, animal welfare concerns in the context of gene editing are difficult to predict, but they may include physical and psychological distress, ethical dilemmas regarding interspecific pregnancies, reproductive risk or other forms of suffering among surrogate Asian elephants and individual woolly mammoths.80 In Harvard/Onco-Mouse, for instance, various opponents argued that ‘it was inherently immoral to alter an animal’s genetic structure in order to create a painful disease’,81 while in Harvard/Transgenic Animals it was submitted that animals are ‘sentient beings which are not to be gratuitously abused or misused’.82 Moreover, the woolly mammoth does not appear to be a good candidate for de-extinction from an animal welfare perspective83—not least because of its long gestation period (eg for a baby female woolly mammoth to grow up and have a daughter takes twenty years)84—but objections to the de-extinction of the woolly mammoth (and by extension to the patentability of a de-extinct woolly mammoth) could also be raised on a number of welfare grounds, including the risk to, and suffering of, Asian Elephants, which are the ideal egg donors and surrogate mothers for mammoths.85 Although Asian elephants appear to be a ‘suitable maternal host’,86 Nicholls points out that the ‘cost on the elephants is too great’: . . . the individual elephants could develop ovarian tumors or be o