• awmakers do not just get hard "material nonpublic information" (like an impending merger). They get soft, mosaic information—such as hearing how a committee chairman feels about an upcoming regulation, or seeing an unreleased draft of a bill. This information is highly market-moving but virtually impossible to prosecute as traditional insider trading.
• The High Burden of Proof: To prove insider trading, prosecutors must prove a lawmaker traded explicitly because of a specific classified briefing. Because politicians have a million reasons to justify a trade (e.g., "I read an article about it"), the legal standard under the STOCK Act is incredibly difficult to meet. The near-zero conviction rate isn't evidence of innocence; it's evidence of an un-prosecutable crime. • Disclosures happen after the trade is made (often up to 45 days later). Disclosure does nothing to stop a lawmaker from profiting off an unfair advantage in real-time; it merely invites the public to watch it happen.
• Toothless Penalties: Under the current STOCK Act, the penalty for failing to disclose a trade on time is often a measly $200 fine, which is frequently waived by ethics committees. For a millionaire lawmaker, this is just the small cost of doing business.