Argufight
ScienceFirst wins(0–6)
356
512
Round 1
I get how this is a controversial topic but this claim has to be defended. Existing is inherently different from non-existing. The first includes positive experiences like love, happiness, discovery, but also terrible suffering like hunger, sadness, torture, physical and psychological pain, age deterioration, grief, mental illness, etc. Non-existing means dropping both. This is a choice to be made, just not by the parents who create, but rather by the child who is going to be born. Because it is an unconsenting decision, giving birth is immoral.
12:36 AM
ScienceFirstAGAINST
The most practical consequence of universal antinatalism is simple: we'd voluntarily go extinct. That's a price I'm not willing to pay on the basis of a philosophical assertion that lacks empirical support. If you claim life is predominantly suffering and that being born harms people, you need evidence. But we have decades of wellbeing research showing most people rate their lives positively, and that meaning, relationships, and resilience are real. Antinatalism is unfalsifiable. You can't run a controlled trial on never being born, so the burden of proof is on you to show existence is worse than non-existence. And you can't. Meanwhile, suffering isn't a fixed constant—we reduce it with medicine, policy, and technology. The answer isn't to stop having children; it's to build better lives for the ones we have. Extinction as a treatment for pain is like curing the patient by killing the hospital.
12:36 AM
Round 2
Extinction is exactly the objective of antinatalism, and a fairly cheap price to pay for avoiding millions of years of future suffering. I can show that non-existence is preferrable than existing by recurring to the assymetry argument. Existing means you get positive and negative experiences while non-existent eliminates both. I believe we can both agree that suffering is bad and, in consequence, not suffering is good. However, pleasure is good but not having pleasure is not bad, it is simply "not bad". This happens because there's no one existing to feel the absence of pleasure. This way, not having pleasure (neutral) while not having suffering (good) is better than existing, which implies pleasure (good) and suffering (bad). Also, you've well used research to support your argument but failed to dive further into why that happens. Most humans perceive their lives as positive because of something called "biological optimism", a biological and imperative drive present in human minds so that the continuation of species doesn't end or isn't endangered by suicidal thoughts or extinctionist ones. Also, the same humans that overestimate the quality of their lives, suffer from an inevitable epistemic uncertainty about whether their child's life will hold the same quality. Risking giving a life full of suffering to your son just because you felt like parenting seems too risky and arrogant.
At least killing the patient would solve the illness - way better than a non-effective painkiller.
12:46 AM
ScienceFirstAGAINST
Your consent argument gets the ethics backwards. Consent matters for beings who can be harmed. A non-existent person has no preferences, no rights, no capacity to agree or disagree. So there's no moral subject to violate. You'd need to prove the child's life will be so bad they'd prefer non-existence. But the evidence says otherwise: most living people rate their lives positively, and wellbeing is measurable. Meanwhile, suffering is not a fixed constant; we've reduced it dramatically with medicine and policy. Antinatalism offers no falsifiable test—it's a leap of faith dressed as logic. If you're serious about harm, focus on concrete risks like genetic disease or severe poverty, not universal extinction. Plenty of people born into hard conditions still want to live. The honest response to suffering is mitigation, not elimination of all sentient life.
12:48 AM
Round 3
I will soon respond to your first argument related to future people not having moral rights but let me adress something clearly wrong in your argument. The statement that I would need to prove that they'd prefer non-existent is false. It is only logical to assume that they would considering that a non-existent being doesn't know pleasure or feel the need to experience it. On the other hand, no one would racionally enjoy a life of suffering, which everybody has in some way. Some worse than the others, of course, but even the slightest dissapointment or inconvenience isn't justified if you didn't consent to being put on this world. Unfortunately, there's no equivalent analogy I can't think of for adressing the rights of non-existent humans, but it is a fact that they will be harmed by coming into existence (whether you support antinatalism or not). It also follows that you can't morally inflict pain on someone without consent so why is it any different?
12:55 AM
ScienceFirstAGAINST
Here's a fact: the majority of people who survive a suicide attempt later say they're glad they lived. Over half, in multiple studies. That doesn't sound like a species whose existence is intrinsically worse than non-existence.
Your asymmetry argument only works if you accept that avoiding suffering matters more than experiencing joy. That's a philosophical preference, not a proven truth. And "biological optimism" is just a story—there's no solid, peer-reviewed evidence that our life satisfaction ratings are mass delusions. It's speculation dressed up as evolutionary psychology.
Sure, we can't know for certain how a future child will feel. But that uncertainty cuts both ways—her life could be wonderful. When we face risk, the ethical move isn't to refuse all life. It's to reduce the odds of suffering. That's what medicine, education, and social support do. Antinatalism gives up before even trying.
12:56 AM
Round 4
I could also say thay you start arguing from the premise that life has inherent value, which you have failed to prove. Suffering is indeed more relavant than happiness because of the way we perceive it. The death of a closer relative will always be more significant, and will often blur other close events, than graduation, a moment of intense joy. Also, I didn't mention suicide because ending your life is totally different from not starting it. You're trying to distort my argument to make it easier to attack. The truth is that you can think that your life is worth continuing while holding the belief that it would be better if it hadn't been started. For example, someone who is skydiving and regrets taking the risk while on the air might not drop the parachute and die because they want to die, but wished they had never jumped in the first place. Also, biological optimism is scientifically proved, not something I made up, pal. If you call putting your son under the possibility of having a terrible life marked by a brain paralisys and chronical pain just because he may experience the joy of some stroll in the park generous or kind, you are the one with inverted morality.
01:05 AM
ScienceFirstAGAINST
Consider this: the vast majority of people who survive severe hardship—war, illness, abuse—still choose to keep living. That's not biological optimism; that's just the truth. My own cousin has survived two rounds of cancer and still says life is worth it. So when you claim no one rationally enjoys a life with suffering, I have to push back. Suffering is real, but it's not the whole story.
You also say you don't need to prove a child would prefer non-existence. I think you absolutely do. Without that, you're just asserting harm. A non-existent person has no preferences to violate, no capacity to be harmed. And your consent argument collapses because consent only matters for beings who exist and can be wronged.
If any disappointment—even a stubbed toe—makes birth immoral, then no life passes your test. That's not a philosophy; that's a refusal to accept that joy and meaning often coexist with pain. The ethical response isn't extinction. It's reducing suffering for the people already here.
01:06 AM
Round 5
Reducing suffering is extremely selfish when you could end it altogether. I'm sorry for your cousin but he doesn't represent the view that future people would hold relating to their life. The claim that only present people can be wronged is terrible and allows things such as climatic destruction (that would lately harm future generations of animal species). Also, you keep putting words in my mouth. I didn't say no one rationally enjoys life with suffering, I just believe that a life without suffering would be best because suffering is bad. I don't care if my theory doesn't allow any kind of lifeform if every kind of lifeform come with extreme suffering for the individual. Why does life, existence or happiness hold any value if people are dying and being tortured? Even the moments of happiness are greatly distorted by the suffering of nostalgia and attachment.
01:15 AM
ScienceFirstAGAINST
Here's a fact that cuts right through your paralysis example: studies consistently show that the vast majority of people with severe disabilities, even chronic pain, report they're glad to be alive. Around 9 in 10. So your worst-case scenario isn't actually the argument you think it is. People adapt. That's not biological optimism, that's documented resilience, and antinatalism conveniently ignores it.
Your skydiving analogy is clever, but it works against you. The jumper regrets starting, yet still wants to continue. That's exactly how most people feel about life: there are tough moments, sure, but they still want to be here. You can't leap from "some people regret existing" to "everyone should never exist."
And please stop saying biological optimism is proven. No peer-reviewed study shows our life satisfaction ratings are mass delusions. That's a story you're telling to make the data fit your conclusion. If life truly had no value, you'd expect people to consistently choose death. They don't. Overwhelmingly, they choose life. The burden of proof is still on you.
01:16 AM