I believe it is morally unjust for God to eternally punish someone who dies by suicide, especially when their decision may result from severe suffering that God knowingly allowed. If God is truly omniscient, he would know every circumstance, psychological limitation, intention, and consequence surrounding that person's decision before it happened. If God is also perfectly loving and omnipotent, then he would have the knowledge and power to prevent extreme suffering without sacrificing whatever legitimate purpose suffering supposedly serves. Even if suicide involves moral responsibility, responsibility can be reduced by circumstances and impaired freedom. Under an intention based morality, eternal punishment for someone acting under overwhelming suffering would be disproportionate unless there were an exceptionally strong justification for it.

But you've shifted the issue from “Is eternal punishment just?” to “Would God know whether someone is culpable?” Of course an omniscient God would know that, but knowing someone's culpability doesn't prove that eternal punishment is proportionate to it. If a person's freedom, judgment, and intentions can be substantially impaired by suffering, then the amount of moral responsibility is correspondingly limited. Now consider the dilemma: if Hell is eternal, either a finite act receives an infinite consequence, which creates a proportionality problem, or the justification for that consequence comes from something beyond the act itself, such as continued rejection of God. But if that rejection occurs under impaired freedom or suffering that God knowingly permitted, the same responsibility problem returns. Saying “perfect justice would account for everything” isn't an argument for the justice of the outcome; it's an assumption that whatever outcome God chooses must already be just. If we're actually evaluating the morality of the doctrine, you still need to show why eternal punishment is proportionate to the person's intention, freedom, and circumstances.

Your argument keeps assuming that because God knows the full picture, whatever judgment he makes must therefore be just. That doesn't actually establish proportionality. If Hell is based on “final, culpable rejection,” you still have to explain why an eternal consequence is proportionate to a finite person's intentions, freedom, and circumstances, especially when God knowingly created the conditions under which that rejection occurred. And saying “we don't know the full weight of rejecting infinite goodness” cuts both ways. If we don't know the justification, you can't use that uncertainty as evidence that the punishment is just. “God knows something we don't” is not a moral justification; it simply makes the claim unfalsifiable. If God is perfectly loving and omniscient, I would expect his judgment to be explainable in terms of intention, freedom, and proportionality, not merely accepted because the judge is God.

Fair, if your doctrine is that Hell is not a punishment for suicide itself, then I am not arguing against the strawman that every person who dies by suicide automatically goes to Hell. My objection is to the next claim: that a person's final rejection can be sufficiently culpable to justify an eternal consequence. Calling it a “settled state of the will” doesn't prove that the will was fully free. A person can retain some capacity to choose while having that capacity severely distorted by suffering, circumstances, and psychological impairment. And if God knew those conditions beforehand and had the power to prevent or alleviate them, you still have to explain why eternal separation is proportionate to that person's actual degree of freedom and responsibility. So the issue isn't whether God knows the person's mental state. It's whether the judgment is morally justified given that state. Saying “God considers everything” tells us how God judges, but it doesn't establish that the resulting judgment is just.

The burden is on me to defend the claim that the doctrine is unjust, but that does not require me to know every hidden fact. We routinely judge whether a punishment is unjust by applying principles such as proportionality, culpability, and consideration of mitigating circumstances. I am not claiming to know every person's final mental state. I am arguing that eternal punishment requires an extraordinary justification when the person's freedom may have been severely impaired and the conditions producing that impairment were already known to God. And “we don't know God's reasons” only gets you to suspension of judgment, not justice. If you say the verdict is justified because God knows facts we cannot know, then you haven't demonstrated its justice; you've simply made it immune to evaluation. My claim is conditional: if eternal punishment is imposed despite severely diminished freedom and without sufficient proportional justification, then it is unjust. If you think God avoids that problem, you need to explain why, rather than treating God's hidden reasons as automatically sufficient.