So the central matter under contention is whether or not modal entailments necessitate modal constitution, whereupon the reasons which people might normally or ordinarily give for the modal facts are themselves contingent, further establishing a regress of conceptual analysis, Entailing that we can't even be sure that we are making the argument. Because if we first take it that the PSR is true, which is to say everything that is the case has a sufficient reason, then it can't be the case that it is only contingently true but that it must be necessarily true. So you create a sort of foundational bedrock for justification or that by the absence of such a foundational bedrock justification becomes meaningless and futile And so it seems like you have to accept that there is something which grounds our reason for believing that the PSR is true and the only thing which can possibly secure the truth of the PSR must be found within the very structure of the PSR itself In other words, the PSR serves as its own justification for it being true, and that it is impossible to have a possible world where the PSR does not apply, as there would be no reason to even consider such a world as the existence of a world where the PSR does not hold true would be in direct contradiction with the fact that the PSR in fact is true. And so the PSR must be true. And so premise one is the PSR is true. Premise two, the PSR, if false, is self-defeating. Conclusion, the PSR is true, necessarily true, and its negation entails a contradiction.