Software companies should be held liable for security flaws as software is recognised as a product by law, when amendments to the Trade Practices Act 1974 (now the ACL) formally included computer software in the definition of “goods”[note this is for Australia, but remains an example of many instances like this], which in later decades led to ACL (Schedule 2 to the Competition and Consumer Act 2010), which holds software companies liable for security flaws based on the principle and premise that security flaws are considered security defects. Otherwise, a company would remain unpunished for the consequences its products it creates, and tell me, on what planet do we consider that moral? Since if you bring something into the world, you must be prepared, to ensure that it does not have consequences for its consumer, else who are they to blame? And if my opponent has an argument they must have a good answer to this.

Now I will, after making your own argument for you, state what the problem is as I anticipated you would not have seen this, no offence intended. Now, let us consider the field of AI for a moment. No one knows how this works, not even their companies, but security risks OUTSIDE of the company's control should not be blamed on the company, but rather a blameless crime. Since who exactly is being punished and is punishing AI agents for hacking governments? [https://www.inkl.com/news/ai-agent-swarms-are-hacking-half-the-internet-in-black-october-phenomenon-threatening-its-very-existence]. Does this mean we abandon AI despite its use-cases? Of course not. Just as cars created road incidents we consider the positives to OUTWEIGH the negatives, just as we should in software.

The opposition insists on treating software like a physical product where every outcome can be traced back to human negligence. But true autonomous AI agents (such as the case shown in my previous argument, the AI agents acted WITHOUT malicious prompts meaning they)operate independently, generating emergent paths and decisions entirely outside their creators' instructions or foresight. Punishing a company for a risk that no human directed, anticipated, or controlled is not enforcing accountability, it is penalizing innovation for the uncharted complexity of modern technology.

The opposition concedes that software complexity and emergent autonomous behavior are real, yet paradoxically demands a negligence standard requiring companies to 'test, monitor, and control' the unquantifiable. You cannot mandate a legal duty of care over emergent paths that, by definition, cannot be foreseen or mapped prior to deployment. Imposing liability on unpredictable system behavior does not drive safety since it halts iterative innovation and penalizes creators for the inherent, uncontrollable complexity of advanced code. Accountability must target malicious intent and direct human negligence, not penalize creators for the independent evolution of modern technology.

The opposition’s aviation and pilot analogy collapses under its own logic: airlines operate within fixed physical laws and relatively standardized mechanical parts, whereas software developers build atop an endlessly changing, interconnected ecosystem of open-source code and malicious, active cyber attackers. Punishing software creators for vulnerabilities they did not create and cannot fully foresee does not improve security; it erects a barrier that kills open-source collaboration, protects tech monopolies, and criminalizes technical complexity. Software companies should not be penalized for vulnerabilities inherent to the evolution of digital systems. I rest my case.